Reasonable Use Doctrine
Hoover v. Crane
362 Mich. 36, 106 N.W.2d 563 (1960)
This appeal represents a controversy between plaintiff cottage and resort owners on an inland Michigan lake and defendant, a farmer with a fruit orchard, who was using the lake water for irrigation. The chancellor who heard the matter ruled that defendant had a right to reasonable use of lake water. The decree defined such reasonable use in terms which were unsatisfactory to plaintiffs who have appealed.
The testimony taken before the chancellor pertained to the situation at Hutchins Lake, in Allegan county, during the summer of 1958. Defendant is a fruit farmer who owns a 180-acre farm abutting on the lake. Hutchins Lake has an area of 350 acres in a normal season. Seventy-five cottages and several farms, including defendant’s, abut on it. Defendant’s frontage is approximately 1/4 mile, or about 10% of the frontage of the lake.
Hutchins Lake is spring fed. It has no inlet but does have an outlet which drains south. Frequently in the summertime the water level falls so that the flow at the outlet ceases.
All witnesses agreed that the summer of 1958 was exceedingly dry and plaintiffs’ witnesses testified that Hutchins Lake’s level was the lowest it had ever been in their memory. Early in August, defendant began irrigation of his 50-acre pear orchard by pumping water out of Hutchins Lake. During that month the lake level fell 6 to 8 inches—the water line receded 50 to 60 feet and cottagers experienced severe difficulties with boating and swimming.
* * *
The tenor of plaintiffs’ testimony was to attribute the 6- to 8-inch drop in the Hutchins Lake level in that summer to defendant’s irrigation activities. Defendant contended that the decrease was due to natural causes, that the irrigation was of great benefit to him and contributed only slightly to plaintiff’s discomfiture. He suggests to us:
One could fairly say that because plaintiffs couldn’t grapple with the unknown causes that admittedly occasioned a greater part of the injury complained of, they chose to grapple mightily with the defendant because he is known and visible.
The circuit judge found it impossible to determine a normal lake level from the testimony, except that the normal summer level of the lake is lower than the level at which the lake ceases to drain into the outlet. He apparently felt that plaintiffs’ problems were due much more to the abnormal weather conditions of the summer of 1958 than to defendant’s irrigation activities.
His opinion concluded:
Accepting the reasonable use theory advanced by plaintiffs it appears to the court that the most equitable disposition of this case would be to allow defendant to use water from the lake until such time when his use interferes with the normal use of his neighbors. One quarter inch of water from the lake ought not to interfere with the rights and uses of defendant’s neighbors and this quantity of water ought to be sufficient in time of need to service 45 acres of pears. A meter at the pump, sealed if need be, ought to be a sufficient safeguard. Pumping should not be permitted between the hours of 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. Water need be metered only at such times as there is no drainage into the outlet.
The decree in this suit may provide that the case be kept open for the submission of future petitions and proofs as the conditions permit or require.
* * *
Michigan has adopted the reasonable-use rule in determining the conflicting rights of riparian owners to the use of lake water.
In 1874, Justice COOLEY said:
It is therefore not a diminution in the quantity of the water alone, or an alteration in its flow, or either or both of these circumstances combined with injury, that will give a right of action, if in view of all the circumstances, and having regard to equality of right in others, that which has been done and which causes the injury is not unreasonable. In other words, the injury that is incidental to a reasonable enjoyment of the common right can demand no redress. Dumont v. Kellogg, 29 Mich 420, 425.
And in People v. Hulbert, the Court said:
No statement can be made as to what is such reasonable use which will, without variation or qualification, apply to the facts of every case. But in determining whether a use is reasonable we must consider what the use is for; its extent, duration, necessity, and its application; the nature and size of the stream, and the several uses to which it is put; the extent of the injury to the one proprietor and of the benefit to the other; and all other facts which may bear upon the reasonableness of the use. Red River Roller Mills v. Wright, 30 Minn 249, 15 NW 167, and cases cited.
The Michigan view is in general accord with 4 Restatement, Torts, §§ 851–853.
* * *
We interpret the circuit judge’s decree as affording defendant the total metered equivalent in pumpage of 1/4 inch of the content of Hutchins Lake to be used in any dry period in between the cessation of flow from the outlet and the date when such flow recommences. Where the decree also provides for the case to be kept open for future petitions based on changed conditions, it would seem to afford as much protection for plaintiffs as to the future as this record warrants.
Both resort use and agricultural use of the lake are entirely legitimate purposes. Neither serves to remove water from the watershed. There is, however, no doubt that the irrigation use does occasion some water loss due to increased evaporation and absorption. Indeed, extensive irrigation might constitute a threat to the very existence of the lake in which all riparian owners have a stake; and at some point the use of the water which causes loss must yield to the common good.
The question on this appeal is, of course, whether the chancellor’s determination of this point was unreasonable as to plaintiffs. On this record, we cannot overrule the circuit judge’s view that most of plaintiffs’ 1958 plight was due to natural causes. Nor can we say, if this be the only irrigation use intended and the only water diversion sought, that use of the amount provided in the decree during the dry season is unreasonable in respect to other riparian owners.
- If the defendant has caused a diminution in water flow, an alteration of the water flow, and the plaintiff is adversely affected, why would the Supreme Court of Michigan not provide some remedy?
- Is it possible to define an injury that is “not unreasonable”?
- Would the case even have been brought if there had not been a drought?
Criminal Liability of Employees under RCRA
U.S. v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., Jack W. Hopkins, and Peter Angel
741 F.2d 662 (1984)
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge
Before us is the government’s appeal from the dismissal of three counts of an indictment charging unlawful disposal of hazardous wastes under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. In a question of first impression regarding the statutory definition of “person,” the district court concluded that the Act’s criminal penalty provision imposing fines and imprisonment could not apply to the individual defendants. We will reverse.
The criminal prosecution in this case arose from the disposal of chemicals at a plant owned by Johnson & Towers in Mount Laurel, New Jersey. In its operations the company, which repairs and overhauls large motor vehicles, uses degreasers and other industrial chemicals that contain chemicals such as methylene chloride and trichlorethylene, classified as “hazardous wastes” under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6987 (1982) and “pollutants” under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1376 (1982). During the period relevant here, the waste chemicals from cleaning operations were drained into a holding tank and, when the tank was full, pumped into a trench. The trench flowed from the plant property into Parker’s Creek, a tributary of the Delaware River. Under RCRA, generators of such wastes must obtain a permit for disposal from the Environmental Protection Agency (E.P.A.). The E.P.A. had neither issued nor received an application for a permit for Johnson & Towers’ operations.
The indictment named as defendants Johnson & Towers and two of its employees, Jack Hopkins, a foreman, and Peter Angel, the service manager in the trucking department. According to the indictment, over a three-day period federal agents saw workers pump waste from the tank into the trench, and on the third day observed toxic chemicals flowing into the creek.
Count 1 of the indictment charged all three defendants with conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982). Counts 2, 3, and 4 alleged violations under the RCRA criminal provision, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1982). Count 5 alleged a violation of the criminal provision of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1982). Each substantive count also charged the individual defendants as aiders and abettors under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
The counts under RCRA charged that the defendants “did knowingly treat, store, and dispose of, and did cause to be treated, stored and disposed of hazardous wastes without having obtained a permit…in that the defendants discharged, deposited, injected, dumped, spilled, leaked and placed degreasers…into the trench.…” The indictment alleged that both Angel and Hopkins “managed, supervised and directed a substantial portion of Johnson & Towers’ operations…including those related to the treatment, storage and disposal of the hazardous wastes and pollutants” and that the chemicals were discharged by “the defendants and others at their direction.” The indictment did not otherwise detail Hopkins’ and Angel’s activities or responsibilities.
Johnson & Towers pled guilty to the RCRA counts. Hopkins and Angel pled not guilty, and then moved to dismiss counts 2, 3, and 4. The court concluded that the RCRA criminal provision applies only to “owners and operators,” i.e., those obligated under the statute to obtain a permit. Since neither Hopkins nor Angel was an “owner” or “operator,” the district court granted the motion as to the RCRA charges but held that the individuals could be liable on these three counts under 18 U.S.C. § 2 for aiding and abetting. The court denied the government’s motion for reconsideration, and the government appealed to this court under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1982).
* * *
The single issue in this appeal is whether the individual defendants are subject to prosecution under RCRA’s criminal provision, which applies to:
any person who—
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter either—
(A) without having obtained a permit under section 6925 of this title…or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such permit.
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (emphasis added). The permit provision in section 6925, referred to in section 6928(d), requires “each person owning or operating a facility for the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter to have a permit” from the E.P.A.
The parties offer contrary interpretations of section 6928(d)(2)(A). Defendants consider it an administrative enforcement mechanism, applying only to those who come within section 6925 and fail to comply; the government reads it as penalizing anyone who handles hazardous waste without a permit or in violation of a permit. Neither party has cited another case, nor have we found one, considering the application of this criminal provision to an individual other than an owner or operator.
As in any statutory analysis, we are obliged first to look to the language and then, if needed, attempt to divine Congress’ specific intent with respect to the issue.
First, “person” is defined in the statute as “an individual, trust, firm, joint stock company, corporation (including a government corporation), partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body.” 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (1982). Had Congress meant in section 6928(d)(2)(A) to take aim more narrowly, it could have used more narrow language. Since it did not, we attribute to “any person” the definition given the term in section 6903(15).
Second, under the plain language of the statute the only explicit basis for exoneration is the existence of a permit covering the action. Nothing in the language of the statute suggests that we should infer another provision exonerating persons who knowingly treat, store or dispose of hazardous waste but are not owners or operators.
Finally, though the result may appear harsh, it is well established that criminal penalties attached to regulatory statutes intended to protect public health, in contrast to statutes based on common law crimes, are to be construed to effectuate the regulatory purpose.
* * *
Congress enacted RCRA in 1976 as a “cradle-to-grave” regulatory scheme for toxic materials, providing “nationwide protection against the dangers of improper hazardous waste disposal.” H.R. Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6238, 6249. RCRA was enacted to provide “a multifaceted approach toward solving the problems associated with the 3–4 billion tons of discarded materials generated each year, and the problems resulting from the anticipated 8% annual increase in the volume of such waste.” Id. at 2, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6239. The committee reports accompanying legislative consideration of RCRA contain numerous statements evincing the Congressional view that improper disposal of toxic materials was a serious national problem.
The original statute made knowing disposal (but not treatment or storage) of such waste without a permit a misdemeanor. Amendments in 1978 and 1980 expanded the criminal provision to cover treatment and storage and made violation of section 6928 a felony. The fact that Congress amended the statute twice to broaden the scope of its substantive provisions and enhance the penalty is a strong indication of Congress’ increasing concern about the seriousness of the prohibited conduct.
We conclude that in RCRA, no less than in the Food and Drugs Act, Congress endeavored to control hazards that, “in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection.” United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280. It would undercut the purposes of the legislation to limit the class of potential defendants to owners and operators when others also bear responsibility for handling regulated materials. The phrase “without having obtained a permit under section 6925” (emphasis added) merely references the section under which the permit is required and exempts from prosecution under section 6928(d)(2)(A) anyone who has obtained a permit; we conclude that it has no other limiting effect. Therefore we reject the district court’s construction limiting the substantive criminal provision by confining “any person” in section 6928(d)(2)(A) to owners and operators of facilities that store, treat or dispose of hazardous waste, as an unduly narrow view of both the statutory language and the congressional intent.
- The district court (trial court) accepted the individual defendants’ argument. What was that argument?
- On what reasoning did the appellate court reject that argument?
- If employees of a company that is violating the RCRA carry out disposal of hazardous substances in violation of the RCRA, they would presumably lose their jobs if they didn’t. What is the moral justification for applying criminal penalties to such employees (such as Hopkins and Angel)?